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We use a two-country model with a central bank maximizing union-wide wel-
fare and two fiscal authorities minimizing comparable, but slightly different
country-wide losses. We analyze the rivalry between the three authorities in
seven static games. Comparing a homogeneous with a heterogeneous mone-
tary union, we find welfare losses to be significantly larger in the heterogeneous
union. The best-performing scenarios are cooperation between all authorities
and monetary leadership. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harm-
ful to both the whole union’s and the country-specific welfare.
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1 Introduction
A country participating in a currency union has to abstain from sovereign monetary
policy. A union-wide central bank conducts monetary policy for the whole currency
area and cannot pay individual attention to every specific country in its decision-
making. In contrast, national fiscal policies typically care about their single country
and not the union as a whole. This gives rise to a variety of possible strategic
behaviors: National fiscal policies can help monetary policy to maximize union-
wide welfare (Gali and Monacelli 2002, 2005, Benigno 2004), they can try to
adjust the outcomes of monetary policy to maximize nationwide welfare (Dixit
2001, Uhlig 2002), or they can be used to maximize the probability of the current
government staying in office after the next elections (Beetsma and Uhlig 1999).
In this paper we merge these three strands of the literature. We propose a model
that allows us to incorporate all three possibilities. We analyze monetary and fiscal
policy interactions in a monetary union under various scenarios and elaborate which
scenarios are preferable from a welfare perspective. We find that from the viewpoint
of welfare maximization, joint cooperation of all policy makers produces the smallest
losses. The second best scenario is one in which the monetary authority has a first-
mover advantage. Cooperation between the fiscal authorities is harmful not only to
union-wide welfare, but also to the welfare of each individual region. We demonstrate
that the more asymmetric the regions, the larger the overall losses and the higher
the relative gains from a first mover advantage of monetary policy.
The literature on monetary and fiscal policy in a monetary union is vast, so we
only refer to articles of special importance for our paper.1 Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b) consider monetary-fiscal policy interactions in a monetary union. They
assume that the participating regions and their policy goals are symmetric and in line
with the common central bank’s target. Accordingly, optimal output and inflation
levels can be achieved – even without coordination of the fiscal authorities and
the common central bank and without the need for monetary commitment. Dixit
(2001), Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) and Lambertini (2004, 2006a) check the
implications of this model for the case where monetary policy is conservative in the
sense of Rogoff (1985). One of their major findings is that fiscal discretion destroys
the positive effect of monetary commitment, while fiscal cooperation typically leads
to less efficient outcomes than discretionary fiscal policies.
Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) construct a symmetric, two-country model
that features government spending in the utility function. They find that the last
1We refer the reader to the textbook by De Grauwe (2003) for an overview of the field, as
well as for references to less recent literature.
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result can be overturned if the share of steady-state government spending in output
is positive and supply shocks are not perfectly negatively correlated. Nonetheless,
for plausible parameter values the welfare gains of fiscal cooperation are small.
Dixit and Lambertini (2001) allow for some heterogeneities by assuming that
fiscal and monetary authorities may have conflicting output and inflation goals.
They show that without commitment or leadership by either authority the ideal
points of output and inflation cannot be attained.
Chari and Kehoe (2004) take a closer look at the desirability of fiscal debt con-
straints. They find that such constraints are undesirable if monetary commitment is
possible, whereas the opposite holds if the central bank cannot commit to its policy.
The latter is the result of a time-inconsistency problem of monetary policy, which
leads to free-riding behavior by the fiscal authorities.
In the very recent literature, the topic of monetary and fiscal interactions has
also been dealt with in dynamic, stochastic general-equilibrium models. However,
the emphasis in most of these papers is not so much on strategic behavior and game-
theoretical scenarios. Gali and Monacelli (2005) e.g. analyze optimal fiscal and
monetary policies in a monetary union where all policy agents care about union-
wide variables, and Ferrero (2005) considers a two region model and compares
the optimal policies to simple policy rules, where all policy agents care about union-
wide variables. Canzoneri et al. (2005) study the interactions between monetary
and fiscal policy in a monetary union and compare the results of their New Keynesian
model with the data. They also assess the effects of regional asymmetries on welfare,
but they assume that fiscal policy is described by exogenously given processes for
government spending and distortionary taxes.2 Lambertini (2006b) attempts to
combine the game theoretical approach of the static models with features of dynamic
models. To do so, she assumes that fiscal authorities can commit to their policies.
Also, she assumes that government spending is exogenously given.
In a series of papers, van Aarle et al. (2001) and (2002), Engwerda et al.
(2002) and Garretsen et al. (2005) focus on macroeconomic policy interactions
of national fiscal policies and the monetary policy of a common central bank by
using a New Keynesian framework. Of these papers, van Aarle et al. (2002) is
the one most closely related to our model. They compare the outcomes of different
scenarios by distinguishing between non-cooperation, partial cooperation, and full
cooperation between monetary and fiscal policies. They find that the stability of
coalitions depends strongly on the policy makers’ preferences. When the countries
2As alternative specifications they consider fiscal policy rules making movements in the budget
deficit lead to reactions either in government spending or in tax rates. In our model, by contrast,
the government budget is always balanced.
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are very heterogeneous, non-cooperative behavior is the most likely outcome.
In this paper we consider a two-country model with a single currency and one
monetary policy conducted by a common central bank. Each country or region has
its own fiscal policy authority that maximizes its objective function with the argu-
ments of output and inflation. The equations of the basic model and the loss func-
tions are derived from microfoundation by enhancing and modifying the Dixit and
Lambertini (2003a) and (2003b) approach. Our contribution here is to accurately
model the possibility of various differences between two countries in a heterogeneous
monetary union.
As an application of the theory, the countries participating in the European
Monetary Union (EMU) are far from being homogeneous. Both, the differentials of
output growth and inflation dispersion, have been significant and rather persistent.
The spread of the key macroeconomic indicators in the participating countries will
presumably become even larger when the ten new EU member states adopt the Euro.
Hence, it seems appropriate to incorporate those heterogeneities when analyzing the
interactions of monetary and fiscal policies in a currency area like the Euro area.
We do this in two steps: First, we derive the output equation from a microfoun-
dation and state that the terms of trade (i.e. inflation differentials) and a country-
specific productivity shock both affect the region-specific output levels. Second, we
take the view that national fiscal policies are concerned with national output and
inflation targets, whereas they are not directly concerned with output growth and
price changes in other parts of the union unless they decide to cooperate. As a sim-
ple illustration relating to the European Monetary Union (EMU), the Greek finance
minister considers the current wage and house-price increases in Ireland not to be of
major importance for his economy. Additionally, we assume that fiscal authorities
have target rates for output and inflation that are higher than the welfare-optimal
rates. Fiscal policy makers aim at reducing monopolistic distortions by granting
production subsidies, ie. we consider a supply side oriented fiscal policy. Monetary
policy is assumed to aim at union-wide optimal rates in terms of welfare.
We analyze the fiscal policy makers’ and central bank’s losses in various sce-
narios: Policies can be conducted under discretion, simultaneously in the Nash
scenario, or sequentially in Stackelberg leadership scenarios for each policy. Alter-
natively, policies can be coordinated between some or all authorities. We investigate
the implications for output, inflation, and various policy loss functions in a numer-
ical analysis, and show that the ranking of the scenarios is relatively robust across
different degrees of heterogeneity.
We find that from the viewpoint of welfare maximization, joint cooperation be-
tween all policy makers and monetary leadership produce the smallest losses. In-
creasing the heterogeneities between the regions implies larger overall losses. Finally,
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we show that the larger the heterogeneities, the higher the relative gains from a first
mover advantage of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
Section 3 the various policy scenarios and Section 4 parameterization, evaluation
method, results, and the sensitivity analysis. The final section concludes.
2 Model
We consider a general-equilibrium monetary model with monopolistic distortions
and staggered prices. The model is closely related to Dixit and Lambertini
(2003b) and Benigno (2004). In the economy, households derive utility from con-
sumption and from holding real money balances. Each household, henceforth re-
ferred to as “producer-consumer”, produces a specific good and consumes a bundle
of goods. There exists a continuum of consumption goods over the unit interval
which are imperfect substitutes. There are two regions, home H and foreign F ,
with the population on the segment [0, n) belonging to the home region H and the
remaining population belonging to the foreign region F , with 0 ≤ n ≤ 1.3
2.1 The Problem of a Producer-Consumer
















β, γ ∈ (0, 1), di > 0, β ≥ 1. (1)
The utility function depends on consumption, real money balances and labor. The
producer-consumer derives positive utility from consumption of goods and from the
stock of real money, while the parameter γ captures the elasticity of substitution
between the two. Labor, which, for simplicity, is assumed to be a linear function
of output and is, therefore, replaced by output itself, contributes negatively to the
utility of agent j. Here, 1 + β is the elasticity of the marginal disutility of labor.
The stochastic variable di captures both the scaling of disutility of labor and the
fluctuations in total factor productivity. Changes in this variable may be interpreted
as changes in technology.4 The total consumption of agent j – who for reasons of
3The two-country setting is taken from Benigno (2004). Other related models are Lombardo
and Sutherland (2004), Ferrero (2005), and Gali and Monacelli (2005b). In general, our
model can be traced back to the seminal work of Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).
4To see this, assume a production function of Y ji = AiN
j
i with total factor productivity Ai and





β with the help of
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where νH is a preference shifter with n ≤ νH ≤ 1 that allows for a home bias in
consumption.6 We assume that both regions exhibit the same home bias, i.e. we
henceforth use ν ≡ νH = νF .




























where h is a generic good produced in region H, f a generic good produced in region
F , and θ > 1 the elasticity of substitution between different goods in the same
region.7 The elasticity of substitution of the home and foreign bundles of goods
equals one. The corresponding consumer price indices – with subscripts denoting
the place of production and superscripts denoting variables specific to agent j or
region i – are





















denote the market-price indices of goods consumed in region i and produced in region
H and F , respectively. Note that the price index PH is defined as the minimum
expenditure necessary for purchasing goods leading to a consumption index Cj of
size one8, and the price indexes P iH and P
i
F are defined as the minimum expenditure
the definition di ≡ δiA−βi , where δi captures the disutility of labor. In the welfare derivation we will
define di ≡ δiξi, where for simplicity δi = 1 and ξi is a stochastic variable capturing technological
progress.





(νF )νF (1−νF )1−νF
for all
j ∈ [n, 1].
6To our knowledge, this model is the first two-region model of a monetary union that features
the possibility of more than proportional demand for goods produced in the agent’s home economy.
7The weights (1/n)(1/θ) and (1/(1 − n))(1/θ) are a “normalization with the implication that
an increase in the number of products does not affect marginal utility after optimization”. See
Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), p. 649.
8The same argument also holds for region F .
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Although producers would have an incentive to set different prices across regions
because of the home bias in consumption, we exclude this possibility by assuming
that goods-market arbitrage leads to identical prices across borders such that PHH =




F = PF .
9 With output produced by agent j in region i





pi(f)cj(f)df + M ji = p





The budget constraint guarantees that the sum of consumption expenditures plus
money demand equals nominal net income Iji , which is the sum of sale revenues from
the good produced and beginning-of-period money holdings minus net tax payments.
In each region, a government pursues its fiscal policy by making use of four in-
struments: a tax rate τi proportional to sales, real lump-sum taxes Ti, government
consumption Gi, and wasteful government expenditures X i. Government consump-
tion of goods Gi is defined symmetrically to private consumption, as given in equa-
tion (3). Sale taxes could also be negative with the interpretation of subsidies. Also,
lump-sum transfers Ti < 0 are possible. For the two regional government budget
constraints we have∫ n
0
pH(j)y(j)τHdj + nPHTH = χ
H [νPHGH + (1− ν)P F GF ] + (1− χH)XH
≡ IgH (7)∫ 1
n
pF (j)y(j)τF dj + (1− n)PF TF = χF [νP F GF + (1− ν)PHGH ] + (1− χF )XF
≡ IgF . (8)
Following Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) we assume that the government can
spend its budget on government consumption Gi or it can be wasted, X i, ruled by
the weight χi ∈ [0, 1].
2.2 Terms of Trade, Inflation and Output
As set out before, the law of one price holds in the economy considered, i.e. pH(h) =
pF (h) and pH(f) = pF (f). Nonetheless, agents appreciate consumption of domesti-
cally produced goods more. Hence, the (consumer) price index in the home region
9In our theoretical model, inflation differentials occur due to the home-bias effect, as the com-
position of the consumption bundles differ in both regions. This assumption is somewhat critical
when referring to the Euro-zone, where significant price differences for the same product exist in
different countries (also for tradeable goods).
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PH includes a larger share of domestic goods than the (consumer) price index in
the foreign region P F . This implies non-trivial terms of trade, which we define as
follows.
Definition 1. The terms of trade for region i, Si, are given by the price of imports





Note that this notation is the reciprocal of the usual definition.10 Here, P i−i is the
price level of goods produced in region −i and consumed in region i, i.e. imports,
whereas P−ii is the price level of goods produced in region i and consumed in region
−i, i.e. exports. The following lemmata apply.





Proof. The equality holds as the rate of substitution between domestic goods is con-
stant in both economies, so that the basket of domestically produced goods has the
same composition in both economies, though not the same relative size. Therefore, a
change in the price index of domestically produced goods has the same impact on e.g.
P FH , the price index of domestically produced goods consumed in the foreign region,
and on PHH , and we can drop the superscript.
Using the definitions of the consumer price indices given in equation (4), we can
relate the terms of trade to the consumer price indices PH and P F and to the price





















In the case of an identical home bias in both regions, which we are assuming here,
the ratios of the two measures of inflation are inversely related to each other:11
Si = 1/S−i. Movements in the terms of trade imply movements in relative prices
and, therefore, shift demand across the border.
A loglinear approximation to the model equilibrium is given by the following two
propositions.
10See e. g. Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), p. 242. The notation is in line with the standard
literature from the viewpoint of the foreign economy.
11See Gali and Monacelli (2002) for a similar treatment in a small open economy setting.
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Proposition 1. Inflation of region i is a function of the deviations of the domestic
and the foreign tax rate from its respective steady state. It is also dependent on actual
and expected technology and real money balances as well as inflation expectations,
all subsumed in the variable µi:
πi = µi + c
iτ̂i + c
−iτ̂−i, i ∈ {H, F}. (12)
Proof. See Appendix A, notably Section A.5.
The parameters ci and c−i denote the impact of domestic and foreign fiscal policy
on inflation, respectively. This equation states that regional PPI inflation can be
explained as the outcome of influences from monetary policy and stochastic events,
from fiscal policy of the same region and from fiscal policy of the other region.
Proposition 2. The deviation of region i’s output from its steady state is dependent
on changes in the domestic as well as in the foreign tax rate, domestic surprise
inflation, the terms of trade and changes in the productivity differential between the
domestic and the foreign region, and is given by
yi = ȳi + a
iτ̂i + a
i,−iτ̂−i + b
i(πi − πei ) + κisi + φi, (13)








τ̄i captures the effect of the home country’s







τ̄−i the effect of foreign
fiscal policy on domestic output.
Proof. See Appendix A, Section A.6.
Note that the steady-state level of taxes τ̄i is negative as will be shown in Section 4.
Therefore, an expansionary fiscal policy is given if τi < τ̄i, i.e., if τ̂i =
τi−τ̄i
τ̄i
> 0. It is
important to keep this in mind to follow the fiscal policy description in the Section
3. The effect of domestic surprise inflation on output is captured by bi ≡ 2βρ
(β−1)(1−ρ) ,
with πei = π̄i = E[πi], whereas the effect of a surprise change in the terms of trade,
si, is measured by κ
i ≡ βρ
(β−1)(1−ρ) . The variable φi replaces the effects of both

















Henceforth, φi is denoted as the “region-specific” output shock. In the following
section we will focus attention on the equations given in Proposition 1 and 2, which




We consider a region to be defined by a set of countries characterized by a high
degree of homogeneity and exposed to similar shocks. Thus, fiscal policies within a
specific region can be considered as being coordinated, as each region has to optimize
a similar problem.12 Instead of home region H and foreign region F we will from
now on denote the two regions as region A and region B to take a neutral point of
view.
In the whole currency area, the population is given by a continuum of agents
on the interval [0, 1], with [0, n] living in region A and [n, 1] in region B. The
fiscal authority in region i chooses a policy variable τi, with i = A, B, where τi is a
shortcut to τ̂i, the notation used in the previous section. Fiscal policy affects national
output, yi, and national inflation, πi, as well as union-wide output, y, and inflation,
π.13 Union-wide variables are given by the weighted sum of the region-specific levels,
where the weights of the regions are given by n and (1 − n), respectively. In the
following, we show the essential building blocks of our model:
Output Equation for Region i
Output in region i was derived in the micro-model in Section 2 and is explicitly
given by equation (A.53) in the Appendix. For convenience, we restate it here:
yi = ȳi + a
iτi + a
i,jτj + b
i(πi − πei ) + κisi + φi , (14)
where j denotes “not region i”. According to Kydland and Prescott (1979)
and Barro and Gordon (1983), surprise inflation may generate an increase in
the national output level. Workers demand nominal wages that are sufficiently high
to cover expected average future price increases. When the inflation rate reaches
an unexpectedly high level, i. e. π > πe, it leads ex post to lower real wages and
increases employment and, thereby, output. Therefore, bi has a positive sign.
A higher τi corresponds to a more expansionary fiscal policy. It can be interpreted
as subsidies granted by the fiscal policies to reduce the frictions stemming from
monopolistic power.14 Additionally, fiscal policies have positive spill-over effects
12Alternatively, one region could capture one specific country of interest, while the other region
refers to the remainder of the monetary union.
13More precisely, yi denotes the percentage deviation of output from its steady state. Henceforth,
we use “output” for reasons of brevity.
14This interpretation of τi is in line with our microfoundation in Section 2 and is also typically
used in New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models.
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onto the other region. Therefore, for the supply-side fiscal policy considered both
ai and aij have a positive sign.
The term κisi denotes the change in the current account, where κ
i > 0 and the
terms of trade, si, from the perspective of region i, which is given by the log-linear
approximation of equation (10):
si = (πj − πi) . (15)
We know from empirical studies that the terms of trade effect also depends on the
region’s size. This means that a smaller region typically has a higher κi, implying
that inflation differentials have a greater effect on output, something that is missing
here.15 A higher inflation rate in region j than in region i corresponds to a real
depreciation of region i and thus increases its net exports. This shift of consumption
from foreign goods (region j) to domestic goods (region i) increases domestic income.
Finally, a random shock φi enters the output equation, which is an i.i.d. shock
with zero mean and a variance σ2φi . In the microfounded model we show that this
shock is the weighted sum of the deviations of the two regional (stationary) produc-
tivity processes from their respective steady states.
Inflation Equation of Country i
Inflation differences within the monetary union are caused by asymmetric shocks and
country-specific fiscal policy actions. Thus, inflation in region i evolves according to
πi = µ + ciτi + c
ijτj , (16)
as derived in Section 2 and before equation (A.48) in the appendix. The central
bank influences a policy variable µ, where we assume that monetary policy has the
same impact on inflation in both regions.16 Analogously to Dixit and Lambertini
(2003a), “µ stands for some actual policy variable such as the base money supply or
a nominal interest rate, and determines a component of the price level,” (p. 1525).
Therefore, a higher µ implies a more expansionary monetary policy.
The parameter ci refers to the influence of national fiscal policies on inflation,
and cij measures the spill-over effects on region i’s inflation stemming from foreign
fiscal policy.
15Note that we implicitly assume that the intensity of trade inside the currency area is high
enough for effects from outside the union to be neglected. Another possibility for eliminating
outside effects is to assume that all regions within the monetary union have similar trade relations
with the rest of the world, such that these are negligible for our results.
16In this context, Adão et al (2004) show that monetary policy cannot be used to offset id-
iosyncratic shocks within different countries belonging to a monetary union, as common monetary
policy affects the monetary union as a whole.
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Note that the parameters ci and cij have a negative sign: Dixit and Lambertini
(2003a) indicate that the sign of the parameters may become negative when tax cuts
and subsidies raise the supply of goods and are at the same time financed by income
taxes, which lead to a crowding out of private demand. This is in line with the
microfounded model of Section 2. By contrast, a positive sign is likely to appear
when fiscal policies are characterized by demand-side policies. This effect may be
stronger if government expenditures are financed by distortionary production taxes
reducing supply. We focus on supply-side fiscal policy. Accordingly, ci and cij,
both, have a negative sign, but the absolute value of ci is higher than that of cij,
i. e., direct effects from fiscal policies are stronger than the resulting spill-over effects
to the other region.
Rational Expectations
The private sector has rational expectations about inflation, i. e. the following con-
dition holds:
πei = E(πi). (17)
Target Functions of Fiscal Authorities
Fiscal authorities minimize a quadratic loss function that aims at national inflation
and national output. The functional form of the loss function is identical to that of





(πi − πiF )2 + θiF (yi − yiF )2
]
. (18)
Note that πiF is the fiscal policy’s inflation target in region i, and y
i
F is the desired
output level of the fiscal authority in region i. According to the utility-based welfare
criterion, these reference values should be equal to zero for inflation and to the
flexible price output plus the steady state deviation from the efficient steady state
in the case of output.17 If both fiscal authorities and the monetary authority agree on
the targets, the first-best situation with the highest possible welfare can be obtained.
This is demonstrated in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and corresponds to the
joint cooperation case in our model, which will be introduced later.
However, EMU national governments and the ECB have often disagreed about
the appropriate strategy for their policies. Therefore, we deviate from the microeco-
nomic model by presuming that the fiscal targets deviate from the socially optimal
level. More specifically, for inflation and output we assume target levels that are
17With some simplifying assumptions, the optimal target for output is also zero.
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both above the socially optimal levels. This may be justified by the fiscal policy
makers’ desire to attain greater government size (cf. Fatas and Rose, 2001) or
their incentive to maximize reelection probability (cf. Beetsma and Uhlig, 1999).
To illustrate this, one can imagine that fiscal authorities are able to deceive their
voters about the socially optimal targets, particularly during election campaigns.
This would be especially true of a monetary union, where fiscal policy communi-
cates with the domestic society, while monetary policy is centralized and concerned
with the whole society of the monetary union. Accordingly, it communicates with
the private sector of the individual regions from a greater distance.
Furthermore, the inflation and output targets of fiscal policies in both regions
may differ. Economically intuitive reasons for considering different inflation targets
on the part of the agents may be given (i) by home-bias effects in the consumption
of goods, (ii) by different elasticities of substitution in the representative agents’
utility function across regions, or (iii) by different proportions of tradeable and non-
tradeable goods in both regions. In our microeconomic model we have incorporated a
home-bias effect in consumption and considered region-specific productivity shocks,
which represent possible reasons for different fiscal targets in the two regions.
Target Function of the Common Central Bank
The common central bank is assumed to optimize the union-wide social welfare











(πB − πBM)2 + θBM(yB − yBM)2
)]
. (19)
In the case of excessive fiscal targets, as motivated above, we can state that the







F for all i. Our model differs in that respect from the
approach of Dixit and Lambertini (2003b): They assume that fiscal policies act
in a socially optimal manner and the central bank is too conservative, whereas we
claim that the central bank maximizes union-wide welfare and fiscal policies act in
too expansionary a way.
The different weights on output stabilization and the different output and infla-
tion targets of monetary and fiscal policies give rise to trade-offs among policy mak-
ers. Whereas the fiscal authorities attach greater importance to output stabilization
(and to pushing output and inflation above their natural levels), the common central
bank sets a relatively higher weight on stabilization of inflation. These conflicting
18The derivation is available from the authors upon request.
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targets induce strategic behavior among the policy makers, which is examined in
the following.
3.2 Scenarios of Simultaneous Decision-Making
In this subsection, we consider the scenario in which both fiscal authorities and
the common central bank choose their optimal policies simultaneously. As the an-
alytical results are dreadfully tedious,we restrict our policy analysis to a numerical
examination undertaken in Section 4.
3.2.1 Nash Behavior
First, we consider the scenario of uncoordinated fiscal and monetary policies. The
policy makers decide upon their optimal policies after having observed the realiza-
tions of the region-specific shocks. Thus, they take the households’ expectations on
inflation as given. For better understanding, the sequence is depicted in Figure 1.




t with i = A, B
φi
Country A’s fiscal policy maker optimizes the social loss function (18) with re-
spect to τA, while taking the decision of the other region’s fiscal policy, τB, and
the policy choice of the common central bank, µ, as given. Accordingly, country B
optimizes (18) with respect to τB, while taking the policy choices of fiscal policy in
country A (τA) and that of the common central bank (µ) as given.
Simultaneously, monetary policy optimizes the union-wide social loss function
(19), taking the fiscal policy actions and the expectations of the private sector as
given.
3.2.2 Cooperation of Monetary and Fiscal Policies
According to many economists and politicians, coordination plays a crucial role.
This is emphasized by the fact that regions and international organizations create
institutions like the Stability and Growth Pact and aim at further common targets
like tax harmonizations, which are only a few examples of coordination instruments.
In this subsection, we analyze the scenario of coordination under discretion char-












F = θM = θJC , where
the subscript JC denotes the “joint cooperation” scenario. The timing of political
decision-making corresponds to the Nash scenario and is illustrated in Figure 1. We





[(πA − πJC)2 + θJC(yA − yJC)2] (20)
+(1− n)1
2
[(πB − πJC)2 + θJC(yB − yJC)2] .
The minimizing problem follows the same pattern as in the Nash scenario, the only
difference being that all authorities face the same loss function. We, implicitly, treat
the joint cooperation case as if the policy makers were committed to the socially
optimal targets, i.e. we assume that all policy makers aim at attaining the social
optimum in this scenario and that the private sector is aware of that when forming
its expectations about inflation. We do not incorporate possible deviations from this
strategy, though this could be an interesting enhancement of this model. Thus,
the first-best optimum for the private agents is attainable under joint cooperation.
Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) use the same assumption in their model. We return
to this point in Section 4.
3.2.3 Independent Monetary Policy and Cooperation between Fiscal
Policies
If fiscal policy makers agree on cooperation while monetary policy acts indepen-
dently, the fiscal authorities optimize a similar loss function as in the joint cooper-
ation scenario. The loss function differs in the target values of inflation and output












(πB − πBFC)2 + θFC(yB − yBFC)2
]
,
where the subscript FC denotes “fiscal cooperation”. The monetary authority op-
timizes the loss function (19). The solution is obtained analogously to the previous
cases.
3.3 Scenarios of Sequential Decision-Making
The policy choices made by monetary and fiscal authorities may possibly take place
at different times due to certain pre-scheduled rules, bureaucracy, or special intrin-
sic features of the political institutions. Therefore, we focus here on interactions
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between fiscal and monetary policies when both authorities act sequentially. The
evaluation of the different scenarios follows in Section 4.
3.3.1 Stackelberg Leadership of Fiscal Policy
We begin with the scenario of fiscal leadership, i. e. fiscal policy makers have to
decide on their policy actions before monetary policy has been implemented and
after having observed the realization of the regional shocks φi. Thereby, they take
the household’s inflation expectation as given. Beetsma and Bovenberg (1998)
argue that fiscal leadership seems to be more likely when monetary policy can be
implemented and adjusted more quickly than fiscal policy. This may be applicable
when choices for taxes and subsidies are accompanied by bureaucratic and legislative
processes that provide the fiscal authority with leadership over monetary policy. The
sequence in that scenario is depicted in Figure 2.









The solution of the game is obtained by backward induction. Solving the mon-
etary policy’s optimization problem at the second stage of the game leads to the
optimal choice of µ while taking the fiscal policy variables τA and τB as given. In
the first stage, the fiscal policy maker of region i optimizes τi to react to the action
taken by the policy maker of region j, τj, and subject to the monetary reaction
function, which is derived from the second stage of the game.
3.3.2 Stackelberg Leadership of Monetary Policy
In contrast to the previous case, monetary policy attains Stackelberg leadership over
fiscal policies if it only affects the economy with a lag of time exceeding the legislative
and bureaucratic time needed for fiscal policy decision-making. The timing is shown
in Figure 3. The solution is similar to the former scenario of fiscal leadership. In the
second stage, fiscal policy makers minimize the loss function (18) analogously to the
Nash scenario shown above, given the other region’s fiscal policy and the monetary
policy variable µ. The common central bank chooses µ in the first stage, given the
best responses of the fiscal policies τA and τB.
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3.3.3 Fiscal Cooperation and Sequential Policy Actions
Analogously to the fiscal corporation scenario where the policy makers choose their
optimal policies simultaneously, one can also assume coordination between national
fiscal policies when the decision-making on monetary and fiscal policies takes place at
different stages. The motivation for a coordinated fiscal policy in a sequential policy
game corresponds to that of fiscal coordination in a simultaneous game. Accordingly,
we also analyze scenarios (i) fiscal cooperation when fiscal policy moves first and (ii)
fiscal cooperation when monetary policy moves first.
The time structure of scenario (i) corresponds to the one in Figure 2, while the
time structure of scenario (ii) corresponds to that in Figure 3. The optimization
problem under both scenarios follows the same pattern as in the corresponding
sequential scenarios without coordination and are, therefore, omitted in this section.
4 Results
In the following we derive numerical results for the seven scenarios of strategic
behavior between monetary and fiscal authorities introduced in the previous section.
We, first, describe the calibration of the model. Second, we show the evaluation
methods used for the ranking of the different scenarios. Third, we run simulations
for the case of a homogeneous and a heterogeneous monetary union by using the
structural parameters from the microfounded model of Section 2. In this case, fiscal
policy aims at granting production subsidies and levying per-capita taxes to reduce
the distortions caused by monopoly power. We use the results from the homogeneous
monetary union as a reference case and compare the rankings of different scenarios
in the heterogeneous case. Fourth, we strengthen our results by using a sensitivity
analysis of both the structural parameters and the policy targets.
4.1 Calibration
We calibrate the structural parameters of the model in accordance with the stan-
dard literature, as referred to in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a, Appendix F). The
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elasticity of marginal disutility of labor is set at 0.45, a value proposed by Blan-
chard and Fischer (1989).19 This implies that the disutility parameter β, which
is one plus the inverse of the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor, has the value
β = 3.22. The Calvo-stickiness parameters ΦH and ΦF are set at a moderate value
of 0.5, implying an average price to be fixed for three periods. The elasticity of
substitution between goods of the same region is set at θ = 11, as in Dixit and
Lambertini (2003a). Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) discuss the literature that
has found values between 1 and 20. Note that the elasticity of substitution between
goods of different regions is set to unity, as in Benigno (2004). In setting the steady
state of the technology parameter as d̄i = 1 and the subjective discount factor as
η = 0.98 we strictly follow Dixit and Lambertini (2003a). The steady-state value
for the fiscal policy instrument is assumed to be set optimally, i. e. to offset mo-
nopolistic distortion. Via τ̄i = 1/(1− θ) we obtain a subsidy rate of ten percent for
both regions in the steady state.
We look here at two different cases. In the first case, both regions have the
same size (n = 1−n = 0.5) and are completely symmetric, with identical structural
parameters, identical fiscal policies, and no home bias (νH = νF = 0.5). In the
second case, region B accounts for only 30 percent of the union and displays more
price rigidities. The latter assumption is based on the findings of Benigno and
Lopez-Salido (2004). They estimate the price rigidity in five core EMU countries
and identify substantial heterogeneities.20
In the second case we presume that there is also a considerable home bias in
consumption in both regions, thus following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
Given the values stated above, we can calculate the various parameters ai, bi,
ci, and κi in the model equations. Also, we can infer the values in the policy
loss functions maximizing social welfare: In the symmetric case, these are target
values for inflation and output, both equal zero, and a weight on output of θAM =
θBM = 0.00763. In the asymmetric case, the output weight for region B rises to
θBM = 0.01046, while all other socially optimal target values remain the same.
As stated earlier, we assume that the common central bank sticks to these values,
while the fiscal policy authorities may deviate from them. There may be various
reasons for such deviation, for example systematic mismeasurement by the fiscal
19The authors discuss this parameter on page 341. Dixit and Lambertini (2003a) assume unit
wage elasticity and thus less curvature.
20The average price duration varies between around four quarters in the Netherlands and Ger-
many and up to 17 quarters in Spain, implying price rigidity parameters between 0.75 and 0.94.
We will choose numbers between 0.5 and 0.58, following the more conservative estimates of Bils
and Klenow (2004). For a closer look at European data, the reader is referred to Dhyne et al.
(2005).
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Table 1: Calibration of the Baseline Model
Parameter Value∗ Alternative∗ Explanation
Structural parameters
n 0.50 0.70 Size of region A
ν 0.50 0.80 Parameter capturing preference for home goods
β 3.22 3.22 One plus one over the elasticity of marginal disu-
tility of labor
Φ 0.50 0.58 Fraction of firms that cannot adjust prices
θ 11.00 11.00 Elasticity of substitution between goods
di 1.00 1.00 Technology parameter
η 0.98 0.98 Subjective discount factor
τ̄i -0.10 -0.10 Steady state value of taxes
Loss functions
θiM 0.00736 0.01046 Central bank’s weighting factor for output gap
πiM 0.00 0.00 Inflation target of the central bank
yiM 0.00 0.00 Output gap target of the central bank
θiF 1.00 1.25 Fiscal policy’s weighting factor for output gap
πiF 0.02 0.03 Inflation target of fiscal policy
yiF 0.015 0.025 Output gap target of fiscal policy
Remarks: The term “Value” denotes the value chosen for both regions in the symmetric
case and for region A in the asymmetric case. “Alternative” denotes the value chosen for
region B in the asymmetric case. i = A,B.
authorities or the fiscal authorities maximizing a different objective function they
are able to conceal from the households. This was substantiated in Section 3. More
particularly, we assume that the fiscal policy authorities put equal weight on output
and inflation of unity. Furthermore, fiscal policies have higher target values for
output yAF = y
B




F = 0.02. In the asymmetric case,
fiscal policy in region B even puts a weight of θBF = 1.25 on output, sets its output
target at yBF = 0.025 and its inflation target at π
B
F = 0.03, which could be seen as the
result of its self-perception as a high-growth, catch-up region. Table 1 summarizes
this calibration. As in Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), the stochastic term is
calibrated to match the variance of output around its steady state as plus/minus
six percent, as is the case for the U. S.
As set out in Section 3, we assume that the private sector has rational expecta-
tions about inflation. In our analytical calculations, we treat πeA and π
e
B as given.
The inflation expectations of the private agents in both countries are determined
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in our model by iteration. In other words, we use an arbitrary starting value for
the inflation expectations in both countries and repeat the optimization calculations
until the inflation expectations differ from realized inflation by a value of less than
10−10 for both countries, while keeping the shock at its expected value of zero. This
approach guarantees that πei = E(πi) holds for i = A, B. After inflation expec-
tations are determined, we simulate our model by averaging over 100,000 random
draws of the stochastic processes.
4.2 Evaluation Method
The main purpose of our numerical approach is to rank the different scenarios of
strategic behavior of monetary and fiscal policies for the losses they induce. We
distinguish three approaches:
(i) Evaluation of the loss functions referring to the policy exercised by the fiscal
and monetary authorities. In each cooperation scenario, the corresponding
loss function is a compromise between the cooperating authorities.
(ii) Evaluation of the region-specific loss functions. In each cooperation scenario,
these are the region-specific loss functions the policy authorities would mini-
mize if they were not cooperating. This approach allows us to infer whether
cooperation scenarios are preferable for each participating policy authority.
(iii) Evaluation of social welfare. For each region, we calculate the welfare loss
that arises due to deviations in output and inflation from the socially optimal
values.
We show the losses involved in all three approaches in Table 2. In our discussion
we incorporate only the second and third approach. The reasoning behind this is
as follows: In approach (i), the losses of the three policy authorities are based on
the loss functions used in the optimization calculations. If the policy makers decide
to cooperate, they usually compromise on targets that differ from their own true
preferences. However, the “true losses” which the policy makers face are still based
on their specific preferences. Therefore, in approach (ii) we calculate the values
of the policy makers’ loss functions given by equations (18) and (19), irrespective
of the loss function used for optimization in the relevant scenarios.21 One should
also take these losses into account, when exploring whether joint cooperation among
21Note that by this definition the losses in case (ii) only differ from the losses in case (i) for the
joint cooperation scenario and the scenarios of fiscal cooperation.
19
all policy makers or cooperation between fiscal policy makers can take place on a
voluntary basis.








((πB − πBM)2 + θBM(yB − yBM)2).
Additionally, we express the region-specific social losses in terms of an equivalent
reduction in region-specific consumption units, following the example of Lucas
(2003). A scenario “performs best” when it shows the lowest reduction of con-
sumption units compared to the consumption level in the social optimum. The
calculation of the consumption-equivalent losses follows the approach of Adam and
Billi (2005).
From our welfare derivation we know that for region A
UA = −ȲAuCLA (22)
holds. To derive a relation between a permanent reduction of consumption (given by
δAC percent) and the welfare loss, a second-order Taylor approximation of the utility
















































To calculate the reduction of consumption equivalent to the social loss for region A,




1 + 4(1− γ)LA
2(1− γ)
. (25)
The reduction of consumption equivalent to a certain welfare loss for region B can
be obtained analogously. We use this transformation in the following subsections to
make the welfare losses more tangible.
22Recall from Section 3 that the central bank is assumed to optimize the union-wide social loss,
which is a region-sized weighted sum of the social losses of region A and B.
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4.3 Evaluation of Monetary and Fiscal Policies in the Dif-
ferent Policy Games
In the following we examine the results of the simulations. The model calibration
was explained in Section 4.1 and is summarized in Table 1. A summary of the results
is given in Table 2.
Homogeneous Monetary Union
We begin with a comparison of the losses for the monetary and fiscal policy au-
thorities in the symmetric case. The first columns of Table 2 show that the fiscal
authorities of both regions face the highest region-specific policy losses under co-
operation and in the scenario where monetary policy moves first. The lowest fiscal
losses occur when fiscal policies have the greatest influence, i. e. under the scenarios
of fiscal cooperation when fiscal policies move first and under fiscal cooperation in
the simultaneous scenario. The explanation is simple: Fiscal policies aim at higher
inflation and higher output than the central bank, which targets socially optimal
levels. Due to the low relative weight on output stabilization the central bank re-
acts strongly to offset inflation deviating from the socially optimum level. Fiscal
policies themselves engage in a trade-off between inflation and output when fixing
their own policy decisions. An expansionary fiscal policy pushes output above the
socially optimal level by granting subsidies in order to lower production costs. Thus
it decreases inflation at the same time. Accordingly, output is higher than natural
output and lower than the desired fiscal targets. Inflation is below the fiscal tar-
get levels and slightly below the social optimum. Note, however, that the central
bank reacts strongly to the downward pressure of inflation with an expansionary
monetary policy on account of the high weight on inflation in the target function.
The loss in the Nash scenario is similar to that of the two scenarios where fiscal
policies move first.
In the scenarios where monetary policy takes lead (with or without coordination
of fiscal policies), fiscal policies internalize the fact that the central bank cannot
offset a fiscal policy that is too expansionary. Therefore, fiscal policies are less
expansionary, and output and inflation deviate from the fiscal targets to a higher
degree than in the previously analyzed scenarios. This implies higher losses for the
fiscal policy authorities. The highest losses occur when policy makers cooperate and
agree on the socially optimal targets: On average, the realized value for inflation is
close to zero (but still dependent on stochastics) and output is at its lowest compared
to the desired levels. It is, therefore, questionable whether overall cooperation aiming
at socially optimal targets can be implemented in this setting.
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Table 2: Baseline Model – Analysis of Welfare and Policy Losses
Symmetric case Asymmetric case
Equivalent Equivalent
Consumption Consumption
Calculated Policy Losses Reduction, % Calculated Policy Losses Reduction, %
Policy LFA LFB LM CRA CRB LFA LFB LM CRA CRB
Nash 21.90936 21.90935 0.11895 0.012 0.012 23.82412 51.16257 0.36286 0.024 0.065
(0.033) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stackelberg, fiscal leadership 21.91073 21.91072 0.11582 0.012 0.012 23.80327 51.17020 0.35035 0.024 0.062
(0.033) (0.033) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.019) (0.054) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stackelberg, mon. leadership 23.63918 23.63917 0.01599 0.002 0.002 33.43925 85.52175 0.00407 0.000 0.001
(0.032) (0.032) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.055) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Cooperation 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.000 0.000 0.00001 0.00001 0.00001 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
... region-specific policy losses 31.25024 31.25020 — — — 31.25001 101.25024 — — —
(0.125) (0.125) (0.063) (0.193)
Fiscal coop., simultaneous 21.90926 21.90926 0.11848 0.012 0.012 32.02629 32.02629 0.36256 0.024 0.065
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
... region-specific policy losses 21.90927 21.90926 — — — 23.82536 51.16177 — — —
(0.033) (0.033) (0.019) (0.054)
Fiscal coop., fiscal leadership 21.64560 21.64560 0.11056 0.011 0.011 32.46600 32.46600 0.41334 0.022 0.087
(0.010) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.042) (0.042) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
... region-specific policy losses 21.64561 21.64559 — — — 23.34691 53.74388 — — —
(0.041) (0.026) (0.012) (0.146)
Fiscal coop., mon. leadership 31.24131 31.24131 0.00011 0.000 0.000 52.22477 52.22477 0.00012 0.000 0.000
(0.377) (0.377) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.434) (0.434) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
... region-specific policy losses 31.24143 31.24120 — — — 31.23737 101.19537 — — —
(0.740) (0.740) (0.718) (1.745)
Remarks: LFi is fiscal loss in region i, LM loss of the common central bank, all multiplied by 105. CRi denotes welfare loss measured
in terms of an equivalent permanent percent reduction in consumption in region i. The numbers in parentheses denote standard
deviations.
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Our assumption of a welfare-maximizing monetary policy means that the rank-
ings of the central bank losses correspond to the rankings of the union-wide social
losses. The social losses, in turn, can be transformed into welfare equivalent con-
sumption reductions relative to the social optimum. Accordingly, we consider only
the consumption losses of the private agents in the following. We find that the rank-
ing of the scenarios is quite different in comparison with the (fiscal) policy makers’
losses (see again Table 2). The first best can be attained in the cooperation sce-
nario.23 The consumption loss is also very low in both monetary leadership scenarios,
i.e. when fiscal policies do not cooperate and when fiscal policies are coordinated.
The highest social losses occur when fiscal policies are dominant in the sense of be-
ing Stackelberg leaders, and in the Nash scenario. In line with the explanation for
the fiscal policy makers’ losses, inflation and output levels are closest to the social
optimum when monetary policy takes the lead (together, of course, with the joint
cooperation case).
Heterogeneous Monetary Union
In our analysis of a heterogeneous monetary union we assume that the fiscal policy
of region A follows the same strategy as in the homogeneous case, whereas the fiscal
policy of region B targets higher levels of both inflation and output. Furthermore,
we assume that region B is smaller than region A and is characterized by a slightly
higher degree of price-stickiness. The exact parameter values for region A are again
depicted in the second column of Table 1, while the “alternative” parameter values
for region B are summarized in the third column of this table. Results for the
heterogeneous case are shown in columns seven to eleven of Table 2.
Beginning with the losses for region A, we find that the values of the fiscal policy
maker’s losses are much higher for all scenarios in the heterogeneous case except one:
The cooperation scenario corresponds to the homogeneous case by definition, as all
policy makers agree on the socially optimal targets. The ranking of the scenarios
with respect to the region-specific fiscal policy makers’ losses is similar to that in the
homogeneous case: The highest losses occur when monetary policy has the greatest
influence (monetary leadership scenarios), the smallest losses occur in the scenarios
in which fiscal policies have the greatest influence (fiscal cooperation when fiscal
policy takes leadership, fiscal cooperation and simultaneous decision-making, and
fiscal leadership when monetary policy is uncoordinated), and in the Nash scenario.
The fiscal policy maker again faces the highest loss in the joint cooperation scenario.
We observe almost the same ranking for region B, but the losses are higher compared
to region A.
23The (monetary) policy loss is slightly larger than zero because of the shock in our simulation.
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We find that the losses of the common central bank and hence also the consump-
tion losses of the private agents show also a similar ranking as in the homogeneous
monetary union: The lowest losses are attained when monetary policy moves first or
when all policy makers agree on the socially optimal targets (=first best). The high-
est losses occur when fiscal policies moves first (uncoordinated and coordinated) and
when fiscal policies are coordinated and monetary and fiscal policy decisions take
place simultaneously. This result seems, at first glance, to be contrary to the find-
ings of Lombardo and Sutherland (2004), who state that fiscal cooperation is
welfare-improving. But a closer look reveals that our calibration of a unit elasticity
of substitution between domestic and foreign goods also implies in Lombardo and
Sutherland (2004), according to their Proposition 1, that fiscal cooperation is no
longer welfare-improving.24
The welfare-equivalent consumption reductions under Nash, fiscal leadership,
and the two fiscal cooperation scenarios with simultaneous actions or with fiscal
leadership are about three times larger in the (smaller) region B. Also, the equivalent
consumption reductions are relatively higher in the heterogeneous case compared to
the homogeneous case, by about 50 percent for region A and a factor of above four
for region B. This implies that a model of a homogeneous monetary union that does
not properly take into account heterogeneities possibly underestimates the welfare
effects of certain policies. This finding also suggests that homogeneity is a desirable
feature of the currency area for all policy makers (fiscal and monetary authorities)
and the private agents.
4.4 Sensitivity Analysis
Are the results of the previous section robust to changes in the structural parameters
of the model? To examine this, we vary the structural parameters within plausible
ranges. In Figure 4 we plot the parameter variations that show the highest sensitivity
of results. The corresponding parameters are the elasticity of marginal disutility of
labor (emdl), price rigidity φi, and the elasticity of substitution θ. We plot their
effects on fiscal policy makers’ losses and social welfare, which is equivalent to the
central bank loss for both the symmetric and the asymmetric case.25
24Note also that Lombardo and Sutherland (2004) features government consumption in the
utility function.
25In the figures we use the following abbreviations to save space: For the policy scenarios, Nash
= Nash, Coop = cooperation, FCoop = fiscal cooperation, FLead = fiscal leadership, MLead =
monetary leadership, FCFL = fiscal cooperation with fiscal leadership, FCML = fiscal cooperation
with monetary leadership. The labels on the x-axis denote emdl = elasticity of marginal disutility
of labor, Φ = Calvo parameter, i.e. the percentage of firms that cannot adjust their prices, and θ
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Figure 4: Identical Parameter Variations in Region A and B
Symmetric case Asymmetric case
sym. LFA sym. LM asym. LFA asym. LFB asym. LM


















































































































































































































































































































































Variation of the Elasticity of Marginal Disutility of Labor
We vary the elasticity of marginal disutility of labor (emdl) between zero and one,
where the lower bound is given in Blanchard and Fischer (1989), while the
upper bound is often used in New Keynesian models, see e. g. Gali and Monacelli
(2005a). The effects of these variations on the policy losses in the three simultaneous
scenarios are depicted in the first row of Figure 4, while the second row shows the
effects in the four sequential scenarios.
Increasing elasticity of marginal disutility of labor leads to higher central bank
losses. This result is obvious as, given the other parameters, the same outcome is
produced at higher cost, meaning that the same effort in the production of goods
leads now to a higher reduction of utility than before.
Referring to the homogeneous case, we see that the rankings for both the fiscal
authorities’ losses and the central bank losses are stable: fiscal policies suffer from
the smallest losses in the Nash scenario and if they obtain fiscal leadership, as in
comparison with the other scenarios they are better able to pursue their inflation
and output targets (above the socially optimal levels). The central bank’s welfare
function shows the smallest losses in the joint cooperation case (which determines
the first best) and in the scenario where monetary policy takes leadership. In the
latter scenario, the fiscal policies are restrained, as too expansionary a fiscal pol-
icy would lead to low inflation, which will not be corrected by the central bank
afterwards. Therefore, monetary leadership has a disciplining effect on supply-side-
oriented fiscal policies. The fact that joint cooperation leads to the first best from a
welfare perspective comes as no surprise as all policy makers agree upon the socially
optimal targets, as mentioned in the previous section.
In the heterogeneous case, the losses are higher for the fiscal policies of both
regions, the one with the more conservative and the one with the more aggressive
targets, and also for the central bank. However, the rankings seem to be robust
with two exceptions: (i) When monetary policy moves first fiscal losses are strongly
increasing for higher values of the elasticity of disutility of labor. (ii) The losses in
the fiscal cooperation fiscal leadership cases “explode” to a value of 0.4, which may
be an indication that there is no equilibrium to which rational inflation expectations
could converge. It would be interesting to take up this point in further research.
Variation of Price Rigidity
The third and fourth rows of Figure 4 examine the effect of varying price rigidities
on fiscal and monetary losses. The figure shows that the ranking of the scenarios is
= elasticity of substitution between different goods produced in the same region.
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stable in the homogeneous and heterogeneous case for almost the whole parameter
set, and it is in line with the results of Table 2: Fiscal policies incur the smallest
loss under fiscal leadership, whereas monetary policy suffers from the smallest losses
when it takes leadership and, of course, under the joint cooperation scenario. Again,
the fiscal cooperation fiscal leadership scenario leads to dramatically increasing losses
for more rigid prices, a factor that calls for an analysis in future research.26
Variation of the Elasticity of Substitution of Consumption Goods
In the fifth and sixth rows of Figure 4 we consider the effect of changes from the
elasticity of substitution of consumption goods, θ, on the losses over the range dis-
cussed by Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001). The figure confirms one intuitive result,
i.e. that an increasing θ leads to smaller fiscal policy and welfare losses: higher sub-
stitutability between goods implies fewer distortions from monopoly power. There
is again one interesting exception. For a relatively small value of θ below 10 the
losses explode, which again may conceivably induce indeterminacy of equilibria.
Summary of the Findings
For all parameter variations over the ranges used in the standard literature (see our
calibration), we find that the rankings of the different scenarios illustrated by Table
2 are relatively robust. The sensitivity analysis has also confirmed that the losses in
a heterogeneous monetary union tend to be higher. From the perspective of welfare
maximization, joint cooperation and monetary leadership are the best-performing
scenarios.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the interactions of fiscal and monetary policies in a
monetary union. One main focus was to derive a theoretical model that allows for
capturing heterogeneities among the different countries participating in a monetary
union, and for analyzing strategic interactions of fiscal and monetary authorities.
Why do heterogeneities matter? The answer is relatively simple. By adopting
the Euro, the participating countries abstain from a monetary policy of their own
and fiscal policy remains the only instrument for pursuing region-specific goals and
26The variations of the intertemporal discount factor η, which determines the importance of
“pseudo-future” periods relative to the present period in the producer-consumers price-setting
behavior, show almost the same results as those indicated for variations of the price rigidity pa-
rameter. We, therefore, abstain from depicting and discussing the figures for η.
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stabilizing region-specific shocks. The common central bank has to implement a
monetary policy that is most appropriate for the whole monetary union, and cannot
respond to idiosyncratic shocks and country-specific political targets. This makes
the role of fiscal policies more important and leaves room for strategic behavior in
achieving national goals.
To examine these heterogeneities we have enhanced the model of Dixit and
Lambertini (2003b). From the microfoundation we have established that a region-
specific productivity shock and terms of trade have an impact on regional output.
In Section 3 we introduced different possible scenarios for strategic interactions
between fiscal and monetary policies. In this context we assumed that fiscal policies
deviate from optimizing regional welfare, aiming instead at higher inflation and
output compared to the union-wide central bank. By contrast, monetary policy is
assumed to maximize union-wide welfare.
We have used simulations to evaluate the different scenarios of strategic behavior
for supply-side fiscal policies in line with the micro-model. These aim at granting
subsidies to increase output financed by per-capita taxes. We have thus considered
a heterogeneous monetary union comprising two different regions: a “conservative
region” and a “catch-up” region. We have assumed that the desired inflation and
output targets of the “conservative region” are relatively closer to the social opti-
mum.
To evaluate the different policy games, we have used a calibration of our micro-
model drawing upon the parameters from the standard economic literature. We have
shown that the losses of fiscal policies are relatively small in the Nash scenario, in the
fiscal leadership scenario (for both cooperation of fiscal policies and independently
acting fiscal policies), and when fiscal policies cooperate and all policy makers move
simultaneously. In these scenarios, fiscal policies achieve an output level closest to
their preferred levels, whereas inflation is stabilized close to the socially optimal
level by the common central bank.
The losses of monetary policy, which correspond to the welfare losses of the
private agents, are lowest when monetary policy moves first. The first-best situation
is attained when all policy makers agree upon the socially optimal levels. But as
the central bank and fiscal policy makers consider different scenarios optimal such,
an agreement appears to be unrealistic on a voluntary basis.
In the EMU, fiscal policies appear primarily to track national interests. However,
the analysis has shown that fiscal policies in a heterogeneous monetary union can
contribute to high welfare losses. From a welfare perspective, monetary leadership
or cooperation would then be a desirable scenario for both types of fiscal policy.
To summarize the main findings, we state that if the authorities’ preferences do
not coincide, or are at least relatively far apart, worse outcomes are likely to occur.
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In such a case, designing the institutions so that monetary policy plays a lead role
generates the smallest losses for the agents living in both regions, even with existing
heterogeneities.
The European Central Bank aggressively pursues the price-stability goal, mean-
ing that the inflation rate should not exceed 2%. Accordingly, it appears to act
as a first mover, which is beneficial for welfare. At the same time, fiscal policies
are restricted in their actions by the Stability and Growth Pact, which leaves less
room for pursuing excessive fiscal targets and implies a reduction of the trade-offs
caused by strategic behavior. Recent experience, however, has shown that in bad
times meeting the stability criteria may not be a very credible option for fiscal poli-
cies, especially, when the culprits judge their own sanctions, as it has happened in
the European Union. Therefore, reducing heterogeneities and bringing fiscal poli-
cies’ targets closer to the socially optimal levels is an essential task in achieving a
longer-term stability guarantee for the EMU.
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A Appendix: Details of the Microfounded Model
A.1 First Order Conditions and Aggregate Demand
Consumption maximization is done in two steps: first, suppose that CjH is a single
good instead of an aggregate. Then, utility maximization of agent j in region H













































Second, maximizing CjH with respect to two generic elements c










































27This is a result of the Cobb-Douglas structure of the utility function.
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Adding steps one and two plus the symmetric results for the foreign good – for ease




















We assume that government spending is subject to the same home bias as private
consumption expenditures. This assumption lies between the extreme positions of
no home bias in government expenditures, as proposed by Lombardo and Suther-
land (2004), and complete home bias, as proposed by Beetsma and Jensen
(2004), Benigno (2004) and Gali and Monacelli (2005a).29 The symmetric




















Using the terms of trade and the fact that Cj =
γIji
P i
, we can rewrite the first-
order condition of the producer-consumers with respect to their consumption of a









































M ji = (1− γ)I
j
i . (A.12)
The first two equations determine a home resident’s optimal choice of home and for-
eign goods, the next two equations determine the analog for a foreign resident, while
the last equation shows the optimality condition with respect to money holdings.
















29Our solution is in line with the comment by Leith (2004) alluded to by Lombardo and
Sutherland (2004) in footnote 8. Gali and Monacelli (2005a) cite “evidence on a strong
home bias in government procurement” in their footnote 8.
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region F it is IF =
∫ 1
n




















































Again, denoting “not i” by −i, we define a variable proportional to “wealth”:









At this point it is useful to note that this definition includes the terms of trade be-
tween domestic and foreign goods, as Ii =
P iC
γ
measures the nominal consumption
expenditures using the level of the consumer price index (CPI), while the denomi-
nator involves the level of the producer price index (PPI) as a reference. Using the
identities from (11), one can easily transform this notation into one that includes


























if i = F.
To obtain a single equation for demand, we define the following weights:
wi =
{
n if i = H,
1− n if i = F.










Analogously to Benigno (2004), the smaller a region is (i.e. the higher the degree
of openness), the larger the terms of trade effect will be on regional output (included
in the W term).30
A.2 Price Setting
When selling the product each producer is a monopolist. The producer, therefore,
decides upon the price of the product by maximizing the indirect utility function.
The indirect utility function is obtained by plugging Cj =
γIji
P i
and M ji = (1− γ)I
j
i
into the utility function (1), replacing Iji by the right-hand side of the budget con-
straint, replacing the price ratio with the help of equation (A.16), and simplifying:


















The indirect utility function of agent j is maximized with respect to the price pi(j),
noting that the output produced by agent j is equal to its demand, i.e. Y ji = Y
d(j).31
























Furthermore, we assume that some prices are fixed in advance, comparable to a static
version of the staggered price-setting introduced by Calvo (1983). A fraction Φi of
producers cannot change their prices and thus have to charge the same prices as in
the past, whereas a fraction (1− Φi) of producers are able to set their prices freely
after the realization of the shocks in region i. The price level of goods from region H
is a weighted sum of the average of pre-set prices E[p̄H(h)] and the newly set prices
p̃H(h), which due to symmetry are equal for all producers. Based on equation (5),
we obtain
P 1−θH = Φ
H(Ep̄H(h))1−θ + (1− ΦH)(p̃H(h))1−θ. (A.19)
30Note that our demand functions are more complicated than the ones in Benigno because of
the preference parameter ν. This destroys the identity PH = PF that holds in Benigno (2004)
as long as νH 6= n. If νH = νF = n and 1 − νH = 1 − νF = 1 − n, the consumer price indices of
both regions are identical, and the demand functions become as simple as in Benigno.
31As the decision of a single individual has only marginal impact on terms of trade and the price
indices, this effect is neglected in the optimization.
36
For goods produced in region F the equivalent equation is
P 1−θF = Φ
F (Ep̄F (f))1−θ + (1− ΦF )(p̃F (f))1−θ. (A.20)
























































This can be written in terms of the overall price level32






















A.3 Aggregate Output and Fiscal Policy












Using the demand functions (A.13) and (A.14) as well as the price index definitions
(5), and denoting the lower and upper integral limits of each region i by lli and uli,































32Note that the numerators of the exponents add up exactly to one.
33I.e., lli =
{
0 if i = H,
n if i = F,
and uli =
{
n if i = H,
1 if i = F.
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Essentially, this implies that the goods’ supply in region i is equal to its demand,
which according to equation (A.15) originates from both regions. Total output is
given as the geometric average of output in both regions:
Y ≡ Y nHY 1−nF . (A.27)
We specify fiscal policy as follows: Each fiscal authority uses per-capita taxes Ti to
subsidize production, i. e., Ti > 0, τi < 0. We assume for the moment, that there
is no other government spending, i.e. χi = X
i = Gi = 0. In this case, wealth W
simplifies to
W = γ
νIi + (1− ν)I−i
Pi















and for all i, j.34 This fiscal policy uses distortionary taxation to offset
market distortion due to monopolistic competition. Therefore, this type of fiscal
policy is closest to the theoretical optimum. Nonetheless, our framework allows for
various other fiscal policies.35
A.4 Log-Linear Equilibrium Fluctuations: Price Setting
We log-linearize the model as follows: First, note that a linear approximation of
equation (4) around Pi = P
i = P for all i results in
πH = νπH + (1− ν)πF and πF = νπF + (1− ν)πH , (A.28)
where the inflation rates are defined as percentage deviations of the respective price
level from its steady-state level,36 i.e.
πi ≡ log(P i)− log(P̄ i), given P̄ i 6= 0. (A.29)
34Without the assumption of internationally identical money holdings M̄/P has to be replaced
by [nM̄i + (1− n)M̄−i]/Pi.
35Two alternative fiscal policies – with distortionary taxation that is either wasted or used for
government spending – are analyzed in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b). In the first, τi > 0,
χi = Gi = Ti = 0 and Xi > 0. In the second, τi > 0 (as long as Gi > 0), χi = 1, Ti = 0. Analyzing
the effects of these policies might be a useful topic for future research.
36Under the assumption that P̄ i ≡ 1, one can equivalently define πi ≡ log(P i) .
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Then, equations (A.19) and (A.20) linearize37 to
πH = Φ
H π̄H + (1− ΦH)π̃H and πF = ΦF π̄F + (1− ΦF )π̃F . (A.30)
Combining the results gives
πH = ν(ΦH π̄H + (1− ΦH)π̃H) + (1− ν)(ΦF π̄F + (1− ΦF )π̃F ) (A.31)
πF = ν(ΦF π̄F + (1− ΦF )π̃F ) + (1− ν)(ΦH π̄H + (1− ΦH)π̃H). (A.32)
Now, we turn to the optimal price a producer would set if he could choose the price
freely. According to Dixit and Lambertini (2003a), we refer to the idea of Calvo-
staggered pricing, which reflects a dynamic setting (for details see Calvo, 1983).
Analogously to the procedure proposed by Dixit and Lambertini, we introduce a
discount factor η with η < 1 (which means that pseudo-future period utilities have
a lower weight than present utility). We, first, assume that η equals unity to explain
the “intuitional proceeding”. In the case where prices are allowed to change, the
optimal log price equals
π̃H = (1− ΦH)πjH + Φ
H π̄H
π̃F = (1− ΦF )πjF + Φ
F π̄F .
where πji is the log steady-state deviation of the price that would be optimal if prices
could be adjusted freely. The log price set by producer j is a sum of the weighted
optimal price of producer j, if prices were fully flexible, and the weighted price that
maximizes the expected indirect utility, if prices are to be fixed in future periods.
The weights equal the probability of being able, (1− Φi), or not being able, Φi, to
change the price in the following period(s).
Now we come back to the discount factor η < 1. As already mentioned, the indi-
viduals place lower weight on future utilities. Therefore, the fact that the producer
cannot change the price in future periods with a certain probability is expressed by
a lower weight than the pure probability of future price setting (given by ηΦi) and
a higher weight for the present period (1− ηΦi). Hence, we obtain
π̃H = (1− ΦHη)πjH + Φ
Hηπ̄H , (A.33)
π̃F = (1− ΦF η)πjF + Φ
F ηπ̄F . (A.34)
37 To appreciate this, compare the following procedure undertaken with a simplified, yet similar
equation:
P b = φQb + (1− φ)Rb ⇒ P̄ bebπ = φQ̄bebπ̄ + (1− φ)R̄bebπ̃, which is approximately equal to
P̄ b(1 + bπ) = φQ̄b(1 + bπ̄) + (1−φ)R̄b(1 + bπ̃) ⇒ bπ = φ Q̄
b
P̄ b
bπ̄ + (1−φ) R̄
b
P̄ b
bπ̃. As the fractions
are equal to unity, this simplifies to π = φπ̄ + (1− φ)π̃.
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In the case of η = 0, this setting would be purely static: Here, the (deviation from
the steady state of the) optimal price once an individual is allowed to change price
π̃i is identical to the price that is optimal for the current period only, as there are
no future periods to form expectations about.
Using equations (A.33) and (A.34) to replace the optimal prices in the consumer
price indices (A.31) and (A.32) gives
πH = νΦH [1 + (1− ΦH)η]π̄H + ν(1− ΦH)(1− ΦHη)πjH
+(1− ν)ΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]π̄F + (1− ν)(1− ΦF )(1− ΦF η)πjF (A.35)
πF = νΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]π̄F + ν(1− ΦF )(1− ΦF η)πjF
+(1− ν)ΦF [1 + (1− ΦF )η]π̄H + (1− ν)(1− ΦF )(1− ΦF η)πjH .(A.36)
The overall inflation rate can be calculated by using the previous equations together
with equation (A.24):
π = nπH + (1− n)πF (A.37)
= [nν + (1− n)(1− ν)]πH + [n(1− ν) + (1− n)ν]πF . (A.38)
Equation (A.37) states that union-wide inflation is the sum of the regional CPI
inflation weighted by the size of each region. The second equation (A.38) links
union-wide inflation to the PPI inflation rates in each region, where the influence of
regional PPI inflation depends on both the size of the region and the preference of
agents for goods from that region.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 1: Inflation Determination
In general, a producer sets its price by maximizing the indirect utility function
which results in equation (A.18) above. A log-linear approximation of this equation
around the steady state, solved for the relative deviation of wealth from its steady
state level, Ŵ , is
Ŵ =









where πi ≡ P̂i, and a “hat” above a variable denotes percentage deviations of the
variable from its steady state.38 To replace Ŵ in the last expression, we log-linearize
the policy dependent wealth equation.
38For the approximation of the fiscal policy term, note that ̂(1− τi) = −τ̄i1−τ̄i τ̂i.
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] and si ≡ Ŝi = π−i − πi. m̂ = ̂̄M/P is the
change in the beginning-of-period real money holdings.
In the next step, equation (A.39) – with Ŵ replaced by the fiscal-policy-dependent
equation – is evaluated at both E[ ˆ̄pi(j)] ≡ π̄i, the (log deviation of the) price that
maximizes the future indirect utility, and at p̂ji ≡ π
j
i , the (log deviation of the) price
that maximizes the current period indirect utility. Starting with the first case π̄i,
we obtain
π̄i = E[πi] +
1
1 + θ(β − 1)
E[d̂i] +
τ̄i














= ω̄0,i + ω1E[τ̂i] + ω2E[τ̂−i] + ω3E[πi] + ω4E[π−i], (A.41)













and ω4 ≡ β−11+θ(β−1)
γ(1−ν)
ωw−i
.39 Note that si has been replaced
by terms of πi and π−i. Accordingly, for the price that maximizes the current period
indirect utility only, we obtain
πji =
1
1 + θ(β − 1)
d̂i +
β − 1









1− β − 1










= ω0,i + ω1τ̂i + ω2τ̂−i + ω3πi + ω4π−i. (A.43)
Using equations (A.30), (A.33) and (A.34), we obtain an equation that expresses
the regional producer inflation rate in terms of the log of the price that maximizes
the future indirect utility and the prize that maximizes the current period indirect
utility only:
πi = ρ
iπ̄i + (1− ρi)πji , ρi = Φi[1 + (1− Φi)η]. (A.44)
Henceforth, we will neglect the superscript i for the parameter ρ for reasons of
clarity, because the results derived in the following have exactly the same structure
for both regions.
39We add the term ω2 to show that under alternative fiscal policies this spillover effect can be
non-zero.
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We use (A.44) and combine the two log prices in equations (A.41) and (A.43):
πi = ρ [ω̄0,i + ω1E[τ̂i] + ω2E[τ̂−i] + ω3E[πi] + ω4E[π−i]]
+(1− ρ) [ω0,i + ω1τ̂i + ω2τ̂−i + ω3πi + ω4π−i] . (A.45)
For the other region, analog steps yield
π−i = ρ [ω̄0,−i + ω1E[τ̂−i] + ω2E[τ̂i] + ω3E[π−i] + ω4E[πi]]
+(1− ρ) [ω0,−i + ω1τ̂−i + ω2τ̂i + ω3π−i + ω4πi] , (A.46)
where ω0,−i differs only from ω0,i by the stochastic disutility of labor variable d̂−i
instead of d̂i.
Combining (A.45) and (A.46) and solving this system of equations for the region-































































πi = µi + c
iτ̂i + c
−iτ̂−i, i ∈ {H, F}, (A.48)
with Ω ≡ 1−(1−ρ) ω3
[1−(1−ρ) ω3]2−[(1−ρ) ω4]2 . Under the supply-side fiscal policy introduced








































40Note that the calculations made so far allow for a more general setting to facilitate enhancement
of the micro-model with respect to other types of fiscal policies.
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A.6 Proof of Proposition 2: Output Determination
To obtain the equation for regional output yi, we start with equation (A.26) and






















Log-linearizing this equation and using the notation yi ≡ Ŷi, we get
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
d̂i +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
τ̄iτ̂i +
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1)
Ŵ + Ŵ . (A.49)
Now we follow the procedure in Dixit and Lambertini (2003b) and apply equation
(A.39) in two ways. First, we replace the first Ŵ in (A.39) with i indices and the
second Ŵ with −i indices. We thus obtain
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
d̂i +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
τ̄iτ̂i
+
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1)
[























Second, we do the same thing the other way round, leading to
yi =
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
d̂i +
1− θ
1 + θ(β − 1)
τ̄iτ̂i
+
(β − 1)(1− θ)
1 + θ(β − 1)
[























In the next step, we add up the two equations and divide by two. We evaluate p̂i(j)
in both regions for the flexible price firms, i. e. we replace p̂i(j) by πji , the price that
43
maximizes current period indirect utility only. Replacing πji with equation (A.44)



















(β − 1)(1− ρ)
(πi − π̄i) +
βρ


















The notation s̄i = E[si] is used to denote region i’s expected terms of trade. Given
the steady state of P̄i = P̄
i = P̄ for all i, we have s̄i ≡ 0 so that we can drop this
term. For ease of exposition, we rewrite the last equation as follows:
yi = ȳi + a
iτ̂i + a
i,−iτ̂−i + b
i(πi − πei ) + κisi + φi, (A.53)


















(β−1)(1−ρ) , with π
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